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Introduction
This paper analytically evaluates and compares alternative regulatory regimes that impose di¤erent disclosure requirements upon auditors. Speci…cally, we study a setting where investors decide whether to invest in a …rm based on their private information signal as well as an audited …nancial report, both of which are informative about the …rm's fundamentals. Our model explicitly recognizes that the usefulness of an audited …nancial report is jointly determined by the quality of the underlying …nancial reporting that maps the …rm's fundamentals into an unobservable true accounting signal (i.e., …nancial reporting risks), misreporting of the true signal by the …rm's manager, and audit quality that is the precision/accuracy/probability with which audit evidence collected by the auditor correctly captures the underlying true accounting signal and hence uncovers managerial misreporting (i.e., dection risks). 1 We assume that the auditor in ‡uences audit quality via her costly unobservable e¤ort choice with an imperfect audit technology where a higher e¤ort increases 1 Two other concepts of risk/uncertainty are often studied in the literature: the …rm/client's business risk (which refers to the likelihood that the client/…rm's fundamentals are good or bad), and the auditor's reporting risk (which refers to the likelihood that the auditor's reported opinion di¤ers from her audit evidence). In our setting, …nancial reporting risk is the likelihood that true accounting signal captures the …rm's fundamentals, conditional on the realization of the fundamentals. Our model also has features similar to those in Hillegeist (1999) where the auditor will always honestly report her evidence and therefore there is no auditor's reporting risk (see Lu (2006) and Lu and Sapra (2009) for analyses on auditor's reporting risks). the audit quality only in expectation (i.e., increases the probability of a high realized audit quality) and assume that the realized audit quality, unless publicly disclosed, is not directly observable to the investors. The auditor's e¤ort is motivated by the liability she faces and the investors receive as damage compensation in the event of an audit failure, which occurs when the auditor does not catch managerial misreporting and the investors'investment in the …rm fails. We study and compare two regulatory regimes that di¤er only in how much information the auditor needs to publicly disclose to the investors: a Disclosure Regime where the auditor is required to disclose the realized audit quality for both quali…ed and unquali…ed opinions and a No Disclosure Regime where the audit quality is disclosed only for quali…ed opinions. As will be explained later in this section, we intend these two regimes to embody the key distinction between existing auditing practice and proposed regulatory initiatives that aim at expanding the scope of auditors' communication with investors to improve audit transparency.
Our model generates four sets of …ndings. Our …rst main result is with regard to equilibrium audit e¤ort. We …nd that the equilibrium e¤ort level and hence the equilibrium expected audit quality are higher under the Disclosure Regime than under the No Disclosure Regime if and only if the quality of the underlying …nancial reporting (i.e., the precision with which true accounting signal re ‡ects the …rm's fundamentals) is relatively low. The intuition comes from the fact that investors' reliance on the audit opinion is a necessary condition for an audit failure, and therefore acts as an incentive mechanism for motivating the auditor's e¤ort. The e¤ectiveness of this mechanism depends on whether investors' reliance is primarily driven by the audit opinion's informativeness value (i.e., the investors try to glean the …rm's fundamentals from all available information) or by its insurance value (i.e., the investors attempt to use information to predict the audit failure where damage compensation is received). Under the Disclosure Regime, disclosing the realized audit quality allows the investors to …ne-tune their reliance upon the audit opinion (versus their private signal). When the underlying reporting quality is low, the investors primarily rely on the audit opinion for its insurance value, more (less) so when the realized audit quality is low (high). As a result, investment (and hence audit failure) is more sensitive toward the auditor's e¤ort, enhancing the auditor's incentives to exert e¤ort. On the other hand, when the underlying reporting quality is high, the investors rely on the audit opinion primarily for its informativeness value, and therefore are less likely to invest when the realized audit quality is low. Since investment is a necessary condition for audit failure, this implies that from the auditor's perspective, lower audit quality can reduce her expected liability, muting the auditor's incentives to exert e¤ort. In contrast, the investors cannot …ne-tune their decisions based on the realized audit quality under the No Disclosure Regime, which results in higher equilibrium auditor's e¤ort than the Disclosure Regime if and only if the underlying reporting quality is high.
Our second main result is with respect to investment e¢ ciency, which we de…ne as the (inverse) of the expected loss from type I (a good project gets passed) and type II (a bad project gets taken) errors. We show that enhancing audit transparency (i.e., disclosing realized audit quality) has three e¤ects. First, it enables the investors to …ne-tune their use of audit opinion to better match with the …rm's fundamentals, thus improving investment e¢ ciency. Second, it further enables the investors to bias their investment decisions to seek more insurance from the auditor in case of an audit failure, hence diminishing investment e¢ ciency. Finally, as discussed earlier, disclosing realized audit quality may either increase or decrease audit e¤ort and consequently investment e¢ ciency, depending on the underlying …nancial reporting quality. Therefore, the net e¤ect of audit transparency on investment e¢ ciency is a complex tradeo¤ between these forces. Numerical examples suggest that on the net, investment e¢ ciency is lower under the Disclosure Regime than under the No Disclosure Regime when the underlying reporting quality is high.
Our third result deals with the e¤ect of underlying …nancial reporting quality on audit e¤ort and investment e¢ ciency. We show that under the No Disclosure Regime while enhancing the underlying reporting quality leads to increased audit e¤ort, it could reduce the equilibrium investment e¢ ciency. This is because making the underlying true accounting signal more accurate not only enables the investors to better assess the …rm's fundamentals but also enables them to better assess if the auditor has failed to catch the manager's misreporting by comparing their private signal with the audit opinion. When the latter e¤ect dominates, the investors will over-weigh the audit opinion and under-weigh their private signal in order to exploit the insurance provided by the auditor in the form of the auditor's liability, generating the aforementioned e¢ ciency loss. We then demonstrate that under the Disclosure Regime, enhancing the underlying reporting quality has an additional e¤ect on investment e¢ ciency via its adverse impact on the auditor's e¤ort provision. Thus, both audit e¤ort and investment e¢ ciency can decrease with the underlying reporting quality on the margin under the Disclosure Regime.
Finally, to assess the robustness of our results, we also analyze a simpli…ed setting that endogenizes the auditor's liability amount in case of a audit failure to maximize investment e¢ ciency under each regime. While one may suspect that ramping up the auditor's liability under the Disclosure Regime may provide additoinal incentives for the auditor to exert e¤ort, we …nd that even with endogenous liability equilibrium e¤ort is not always restored to the level under the No Disclosure Regime. Intuitively, increasing liability/damage compensation to the investors exacerbates the insurance value of the audit opinion and furhter incentivizes the investors to ine¢ ciently use their information by increasingly over-weighing the audit opinion, thus decreasing investment e¢ ciency. As such, the optimal liability level under the Disclosure Regime may not be strong enough to restore the auditor's e¤ort compared to the No Disclosure Regime.
The paper is primarily motivated by the on-going debate on whether more information should be disclosed by auditors in conjunction with unquali…ed opinions on the fairness of their clients' …nancial reports. 2 This debate dates back to those proposals in the 1990s to require disclosures of the materiality thresholds used by auditors in reaching their audit opinions (see Patterson and Smith (2003) ). It is also directly related to the current initiatives by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and other regulatory bodies around the world that call for more disclosures in audit opinions to help investors assess 2 The case of quali…ed opinions is much less controversial as under the existing practice auditors already need to provide detailed discussions on issues involved in those opinions that potentially enable investors to assess realized audit quality. their accuracy/reliability. 3 While the content of the additional disclosure requirement at debate depends on the speci…c initiatives/proposals, the general idea is that more information should assist investors to evaluate the usefulness of audit opinions. Proponents argue that more information not only assists investors'investment decisions, it can also provide stronger incentives for auditors to exert more e¤ort in order to improve audit quality. Opponents, however, argue that the additional information may induce undue reliance by investors in making investment decisions, while at the same time it may increase audit costs and auditor's liability. This paper contributes to this policy debate by providing a theoretical framework to evaluate e¤ects of increasing audit transparency and belongs to the broad literature on understanding how audit rules and regulations a¤ect market participants' behaviors (e.g., Dye (1993) , Narayanan (1994) , Hillegeist (1999) ), and more speci…cally, the literature on evaluating their e¤ects on audit quality and investment e¢ ciency (e.g., Schwartz (1997), Pae and Yoo (2001) , Deng, Melumad, and Shibano (2011)). 4 While most prior studies focus on e¤ects of audit liability rules, we contribute to the literature by examining the e¤ect of audit disclosure rules (i.e., audit transparency). 5 Our analysis on endogenous liability demonstrates that these two types of regulations have di¤erent impacts on audit quality and investment e¢ ciency and their e¤ects may not entirely o¤set each other. Furthermore, our result on the e¤ort and e¢ ciency consequences of the underlying …nan- 3 For example, one proposed disclosure item is critical audit matters that "posed the most di¢ culty to the auditor in obtaining su¢ cient appropriate audit evidence or forming an opinion on the …nancial statements."
The proposal is outlined in PCAOB Release No. 2013-005, August 13, 2013. Similar initiatives are also being evaluated outside the US by International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) of United Kingdom, and the European Commission (EC). 4 See also Newman, et al. (2005) and Deng, Melumad, and Shibano (2011) for reviews of related literature. 5 Dye and Sridhar (2007) analyzes how a …rm's existing owners'disclosure precision choice is changed when this choice becomes publicly observable in an overlapping generation model. While the driving force in their paper is the optimal risk sharing between di¤erent generations of owners, we look at how audit disclosure regulation interacts with the underlying …nancial reporting quality in a¤ecting auditor e¤ort provision and investment e¢ ciency. We also note that our result that audit transparency can lead to reduced audit e¤ort 
Model Setup
Consider a representative …rm that has access to an investment project. The project requires an up-front investment K and yields a random payo¤ depending on the underlying state of nature. If undertaken, the project generates a terminal cash ‡ow of either RK (with R > 1)
when the state of nature is good (denoted by G) or 0 when the state is bad (denoted by B).
The common prior for a good state is = Pr (G) 2 (0; 1). Without loss of generality, we assume the ex ante net present value of the project (before any information signal becomes available) is zero, implying that R = 1 .
There are three types of risk-neutral players: a group of potential investors, a manager, and an auditor. Investors decide whether to invest K to fund the project whose payo¤ directly accrues to them. 6 The manager receives an incremental private bene…t > 0 only when investors decide to take the project. We normalize investors'payo¤ to zero in the case when the project is rejected. 7 The state of nature is initially unknown to everyone. It can be partially revealed by a noisy signal from the …rm's accounting system, denoted as R 2 fR G ; R B g with the probability structure of
The higher q is, the more accurately the accounting signal captures the underlying state.
Therefore, q is a measure for the quality of the accounting system, which is exogenously determined by the prevailing …nancial reporting rules and standards (e.g., GAAP).
The manager privately observes the accounting signal R, after which he proposes a report R 2 fR G ;R B g to the auditor and investors. ReportR G (R B ) claims that the privately observed accounting signal is R G (R B ). We assume that the manager's private bene…t from undertaking the project is su¢ ciently large, such that he strictly prefers a favorable 6 Each investor would invest his share of the total investment. Since investors have identical preferences and information structure, it is without loss of generality that we treat them as a collective group who decides whether to invest the total amount. 7 An alternative interpretation for our setting is that investors decide whether to purchase a …rm's stocks, either through an equity issurance by the …rm or from the secondary market. Investors rely on the …rm's accounting and auditing reports to assess the …rm's prospect. The …rm (either manager or existing shareholders) prefers that investors choose to invest, either because the manager enjoys empire building, or because the existing shareholders prefer a higher share price or better liquidity in case they need to liquidate their holdings.
reportR G to a unfavorable oneR B . 8 While the assumption is a simpli…cation, it is needed to allow a role for the auditor. If it is public knowledge that managers always truthfully reveal R, auditors are not needed in the …rst place.
After observing the manager's reportR, the auditor spends resources and exerts e¤ort, denoted by e 2 [0; 1], to collect audit evidence 2 f g ; b g to verify the accounting signal.
The auditing technology is imperfect and correctly reveals the underlying accounting signal only with probability :
re ‡ects the notion of audit quality: the higher is, the more likely audit evidence reveals the underlying accounting signal, the more likely the auditor can detect manager's misreporting.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there are two levels of audit quality 2 f h ; l g with 1 h > l 1 2 and that higher auditor's e¤ort can stochastically improve the audit quality in that Pr( = h ) = e and Pr( = l ) = 1 e. The auditor privately observes e and . She also bears the cost of e¤ort, given by C(e), with C 0 0, C 00 > 0, C 0 (0) = 0 and C 0 (1) = 1.
After observing evidence , the auditor issues an audit opinion, denoted by AO 2 fU; Qg where U stands for an unquali…ed opinion and Q for a quali…ed opinion. We assume that the auditor can issue a quali…ed opinion only when her evidence supports it (i.e., = b ). This is consistent with the practice that a quali…ed opinion usually is accompanied with detailed discussions and hence is likely to be based on evidence collected. 9 8 Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we allow stochastic misreporting by the manager. Stochastic misreporting can be introduced in two ways. First, we can allow the manager to choose t 2 [0; t] such that
where t < 1 is an exogenous upper bound on the manager's misreporting. It is easy to see that in this case the manager will optimally choose t. Second, we can alternatively do away with the exogenous bound t and instead introduce an increasing convex cost C (t) to manager's misreporting. Our results are robust to both modeling alternatives. 9 As will become clear next, if auditors are allowed to issue quali…ed opinions upon observing g , they will always do so to avoid audit failure and potential liability. This will lead to a trivial equilibrium where auditors exert no e¤ort, always issue quali…ed opinions, and investors never rely on auditor's opinions. Anticipating this, the …rm/investors would not pay for the auditor's service to begin with. Alternatively, Lu and Sapra Investors observe both the manager's report and the auditor's opinion. In addition, investors collectively have access to a noisy signal of their own S 2 fS g ; S b g that is informative of the underlying state with
p re ‡ects the quality of investors'signal and is itself a random variable, uniformly distributed on [ 1 2 ; 1]. p and S are realized and privately observed by investors after the auditor chooses her e¤ort e and issues her opinion. Investors then decide whether to invest in the project based on information available to them.
The auditor gets a non-contingent fee F from the …rm at the beginning of their relationship. We assume a competitive audit market such that the audit fee is set to equal the auditor's cost of e¤ort and expected liability in the event of an audit failure. 10 An audit failure occurs when investors choose to invest and the state turns out to be B; and at the same time, the accounting signal correctly captures the state (i.e., R = R B ) but the auditor fails to detect managerial misreporting by issuing an unquali…ed opinion.
We assume that in the event of an audit failure, the auditor's liability is K which accrues to investors as damage compensation. 2 (0; 1) is a known parameter that re ‡ects the severity of the auditor's liability. For expositional ease, in our main setup we will treat as exogenous and doesn't allow it to vary with either the auditing regulatory regime (to be discussed below) or the quality of the underlying accounting system q. We will extend our model to endogenize in section 4.
Alternatively, one can model the auditor's liability as a function of whether h or l is realized (e.g., holding the auditor liable only when l is observed ex post). However, for this arrangement to be implementable, the court not only needs to be able to verify the level (2008) assume an exogenous cost from quali…ed opinions. The nature of audit evidence in their model di¤ers from ours. In their model, the auditor either knows for sure whether manager lied, or is left uncertain. In the latter case, auditor needs to decide whether to issue quali…ed or unquali…ed opinion. In our model, auditor never knows for sure whether manager lied and their opinion can only be based on their audit evidence. 10 Once set, F doesn't a¤ect any subsequent behaviors. Since the focus of our analysis is not on the audit fee, we treat it as a known parameter.
of realized (say, = 3 has realized) but also has to know the exact space of all possible 's (i.e., whether the observed 3 is h or l ). Therefore, making the auditor's liability depend only on investors'investment amount K as our model formulates, while a stylized assumption, does capture those realistic situations in which the court faces frictions and is informationally constrained. With that being said, our results are not qualitatively a¤ected if the liability can be based on a noisy signal of whether h or l is realized.
We study two auditing regulatory regimes, a No Disclosure regime (N D) and a Disclosure regime (D), that di¤er the amount of information available to investors in assessing audit quality ( ). Speci…cally, in the No Disclosure regime, auditors are required to provide additional information that can help investors assess audit quality only when they issue quali…ed opinions. 11 The No Disclosure regime corresponds to the existing regulatory requirement that the auditor provides a pass/fail assessment in her opinion and is required or expected to provide further information only in the case of quali…ed opinions. In contrast, in the Disclosure regime, auditors need to provide such information for both quali…ed and unquali…ed opinions. This regime corresponds to the PCAOB's proposed regulation that auditors need to discuss "critical audit matters" to provide more information to investors regarding how con…dent they are with respect to their opinions. In our model, information on auditors'con-…dence regarding their opinions corresponds to the information about whether audit quality ( ) is high or low.
The timeline of the model is summarized below: Date 1. The auditor is hired and paid with a non-contingent fee F . The …rm installs its accounting information system (the quality of which is q). Nature chooses the state G or B.
Date 2. R 2 fR G ; R B g is generated by the accounting system. The manager privately observes R and reportsR G to the auditor and investors.
Date 3. The auditor determines her e¤ort e and issues her opinion based on collected evidence.
-In the No Disclosure regime, is disclosed only if a quali…ed opinion is issued.
-In the Disclosure regime, is disclosed for both quali…ed and unquali…ed opinions. Auditor's liability is assessed. Figure 1 illustrates the information structure modeled in the paper. Figure 1A shows the auditor's audit evidence , while Figure 1B corresponds to investors'signal S.
Fig 1 Graphical Illustration of Auditor's and Investor's Signal
We next de…ne the equilibrium concept for our model. conjecture of auditor e¤ort b e i , investors' information set i and investment decision
is an indicator function taking a value of 1 if and only if event occurs;
(2) I i ( i ) generates an optimal investment decision that maximizes investors'payo¤ based on investors'information set i . Speci…cally, investors'information set in each auditing regime is given by
That is, with the No Disclosure regime investors form a conjecture b about for an unquali…ed opinion based on their conjecture of auditor's e¤ortê, i.e., b ê h + (1 ê) l ; and
(3) In equilibrium, investors'conjecture is con…rmed, i.e.,ê = e.
We evaluate the social welfare consequences of di¤erent regimes using a measure of ex ante investment e¢ ciency, de…ned below.
De…nition 2 Investment E¢ ciency is denoted by IE and equals
In other words, investment e¢ ciency re ‡ects the expected loss from investment decisions.
It decreases with the expected Type I (i.e., a pro…table project not taken) and Type II (i.e., an unpro…table project taken) loss from the project. The loss conditional on the Type I and Type II error is (R 1) K and K, respectively.
3 Main Results
Auditor' s opinion decision
We start with the auditor's optimal opinion decision. Under the assumption that the auditor cannot issue a quali…ed opinion when her evidence is g , we only need to examine whether the auditor has incentive to issue unquali…ed opinion when her audit evidence is b . Since her e¤ort is sunk at this stage, the auditor is only concerned about her expected liability.
Therefore, she will optimally issue a quali…ed opinion, as otherwise she would be exposed to possible liability. Note that this will be the case in both disclosure regimes. This observation is stated in the following lemma; the proof is straightforward and hence omitted. 
Investors'investment decision
We next examine investors' investment decision. Investors will take the project if their , under N = D. and de…ne
When = 0, investors'optimal investment decision is given by
Lemma 2 establishes the First Best solution for investment e¢ ciency, because investors' payo¤ comes only from the project's terminal cash ‡ow and therefore their objective is simply to maximize investment e¢ ciency. In Scenarios (1) and (2) where the auditor's opinion and investors' signal are consistent with each other, it is optimal for investors to follow what these signals suggest: no investment in Scenario (1) when both signals suggest the state is bad and invest in Scenario (2) when both signals suggest the state is good. In these scenarios, information about audit quality is irrelevant.
In Scenarios (3) and (4) where investors' signal con ‡icts with the auditor's opinion, investors optimally follow the signal that is more informative about the underlying state.
Speci…cally, investors compare p (the precision/informativeness of their own signal S with respect to the state) with the informativeness of the auditor's opinion with respect to the state, which is de…ned as the likelihood of observing audit evidence j 2 f g ; b g conditional on the state of j 2 fG; Bg:
Pr ( j jj) = Pr ( j jR j ) Pr (R j jj) + Pr ( j jR j ) Pr (R j jj)
When > 0, investors rely on auditor's opinion not only for its informative value e¤ect in predicting the project's terminal cash ‡ow, but also for its insurance value e¤ect (i.e., obtaining damage compensation from the auditor when an audit failure occurs). Since an auditor failure can possibly happen only if the auditor issues an unquali…ed opinion and the project is taken, this insurance e¤ect biases investors' investment decision away from the First Best, when the auditor issues an unquali…ed opinion. Proposition 1 below summarizes investors'optimal investment rule with > 0.
Proposition 1 Let~ be as de…ned in Lemma 2. When > 0, investors'optimal investment decision is given by
with (~ ; ; q)
As expected, here investors deviate from the Note that although the presence of audit liability may lead to ine¢ cient uses of information by investors, it does not necessarily imply that the overall investment e¢ ciency is lower than without any audit liability. This is because without audit liability, the auditor clearly will not exert any e¤ort in the model, reducing the overall investment e¢ ciency.
E¤ects of audit transparency

No disclosure regime
We …rst determine the auditor's e¤ort choice in the No Disclosure regime. The auditor
chooses e¤ort e to minimize both the cost of e¤ort and the expected liability, given investors' investment decision. Conditional on and investors'conjecturesê, the auditor's probability assessment of an audit failure is:
Pr (audit failure j ;^ ) = l(q; ; ) p 2 (^ )
where l(q; ; ) (1 ) (1 ) q
and^ =ê h + (1 ê) l :
From the auditor's perspective, the likelihood of an audit failure depends on two events:
auditor vulnerability and investors reliance. Auditor vulnerability refers to the event where the auditor issues an unquali…ed opinion in the bad state (B) and the underlying accounting signal is accurate (R = R B ). The probability of this event is given by l(q; ; ), which is decreasing in , suggesting a bene…t for the auditor to exert e¤ort to reduce her vulnerability.
The event of investor reliance happens when investors rely on the auditor's unquali…ed opinion and take the project in the bad state. Such an event can happen in two situations:
in scenario 2 when investors also receive an erroneous signal S g , the ex ante probability of which is R 1 1=2 2 (1 p) dp = 1 4 ; and in scenario 4 when investors ignore S b , the ex ante probability of which is R p(^ ) 1=2 2pdp = p 2 (^ ) 1 4 . The sum of the two probabilities is simply
Given Pr ( = h ) = e, the auditor's total expected cost for a given e¤ort level e is [e Pr (audit failure j h ;^ ) + (1 e) Pr (audit failure j l ;^ )] K + C (e) :
The …rst term re ‡ects the expected liability and the second term the cost of e¤ort. The auditor's equilibrium e¤ort choice is solved by choosing e to minimize (10) and is summarized in Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2 Under the No Disclosure regime, (a) given investors'conjectureê, the auditor's optimal e¤ort choice is determined by
Imposing the rational expectation equilibrium condition, the auditor's equilibrium effort e N D is characterized by
and strictly lies between 0 and 1;
(b) there exists at least one stable equilibrium under the No Disclosure regime;
(c) de N D dq > 0 for any stable equilibrium;
(d) there exists a 0 > 0 such that 8 h < 0 , the investment e¢ ciency strictly decreases with q.
(11) shows the marginal bene…t and cost of the auditor's e¤ort. Holding investors'conjecture constant atê, a higher e¤ort improves the accuracy of audit evidence in the bad state and reduces the auditor's vulnerability, as re ‡ected by [l(q; l ; ) l(q; h ; )] on the the left-hand side (LHS) of (11). A higher e¤ort is also costlier to the auditor as shown in the right-hand side (RHS) of (11). The equilibrium condition is given by replacing investors' conjectureê in (11) with the auditor's actual e¤ort. This ensures that investors'conjecture is rational in equilibrium.
The equilibrium uniqueness is not guaranteed as both sides of (12) can be increasing in the auditor's e¤ort. Multiple equilibria can occur because investors' conjectureê can be self-ful…lling. Under certain parameter values, the higher the e¤ort investors conjecture, the more likely they rely on the auditor's opinion (i.e., p (^ ) increases in^ ). This in turn increases the auditor's expected liability and can provide more incentives for e¤ort. With multiple equilibria comes the issue of equilibrium selection. We note that any equilibrium with @[LHS of (12)] @e j e=e N D > C 00 (e N D ) is unstable in that a small deviation in investors' conjectureê will not converge back to that equilibrium (Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989)).
Proposition 2(b) shows that under the assumption of C 0 (1) = +1, there must exist at least a stable equilibrium where @[LHS of (12)] @e j e=e N D < C 00 (e N D ).
Proposition 2(c) can be proved by noticing that a larger q unambiguously increases the marginal bene…t of the auditor's e¤ort: both terms on the LHS of (11), l(q; l ; ) l(q; h ; ) and p 2 (^ ), are strictly increasing in q, while the RHS is una¤ected. The intuition comes from the fact that the auditor's incentives to exert e¤ort is motivated by the threat of audit failure.
The odds of an audit failure can be reduced either when the auditor exerts more e¤ort to reduce her vulnerability, and/or when investors rely less on the auditor's opinion (i.e., less investors'facilitation). Both forces can be a¤ected by q. First, l(q; l ; ) l(q; h ; ) increases with q. The intuition is the familiar informativeness principle in agency theory (Holmstrom (1979)) in that a higher q reduces the noise in vulnerability as a performance measure for the auditor's e¤ort. To see this, take the extreme case where q = 1=2. Then, even if the underlying state is bad, there is still a high chance that the underlying accounting system generates R G , reducing the likelihood of an audit failure and thus disincentivizing the auditor to exert e¤ort. A larger q reduces this noise in audit failure as a performance measure and therefore promotes a higher e¤ort.
Second, a larger q also increases the chances that the auditor's vulnerability is "relied upon" by investors. This happens because ceteris paribus, a larger q makes the auditor's opinion more useful to predict the underlying state and therefore induces investors to rely more on the auditor's opinion than their own signal: p 2 (^ ) increases with q. More reliance means that when the auditor fails to catch managerial misreporting, her mistake is more likely to lead to a full-blown auditor failure, thus providing more incentives for the auditor exert e¤ort.
As shown in Proposition 2(d), although a larger q induces a higher auditor e¤ort, increasing q can potentially reduce investment e¢ ciency. Intuitively, increasing q strengthens the insurance e¤ect of the auditor's opinion by making investors increasingly con…dent that the auditor has committed an audit failure when the auditor issues an unquali…ed opinion and the opinion contradicts investors'signal S. To see this, in the extreme case of q = 1=2, the auditor's signal becomes independent of S and thus is not useful in predicting whether the auditor has made a mistake or not. The larger q is, the more correlated S and are, and the more certain investors are that the auditor has committed an audit failure when their signal con ‡icts with the auditor's opinion. An increased likelihood of an audit failure enhances the insurance e¤ect and induces investors to ignore their own signal more often with a larger p.
Proposition 2(d) shows that this unintended consequence of increasing q becomes dominant when h is su¢ ciently small. Intuitively, when the auditing technology is poor ( h is low), the auditor's opinion is not that informative of the underlying state, thus making ignoring a con ‡icting S less costly and the insurance value dominant.
Disclosure regime
The auditor's e¤ort choice under the Disclosure regime is characterized by Proposition 3 and determined similarly as that in the No Disclosure regime. The main di¤erence is that^ in the assessed probability of an audit failure (as in (7)) is replaced by the actual realization of It is easy to obtain @ Pr (audit failurej ) @ = @l(q; ; )
(14) shows that a larger has two e¤ects on Pr (audit failurej ). The …rst is to reduce the auditor vulnerability, as captured by @l(q; ; ) @ < 0. This e¤ect is also present in the No Disclosure regime and it's the primary force to motivate the auditor's e¤ort. The second e¤ect, captured by @p( ) @ , is to enable investors to adjust their investment decision as a function of the realized , i.e., @p( ) @ 6 = 0. This e¤ect is absent in the No Disclosure regime where the decision is based on investors' conjecture^ but not the realized . A larger increases the auditor opinion's information value ( @p ( ) @ > 0) but decreases its insurance value ( @ ( ; ;q) @ < 0). When the information value e¤ect overwhelms the insurance value e¤ect, a larger increases the chance of an audit failure. Since more auditor e¤ort increases in expectation, this would dampen the auditor's incentives to exert e¤ort and lead to a possible corner solution of no e¤ort.
The e¤ect of audit transparency (whether to disclose information about ) on the auditor's e¤ort is established in Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4 De…ne q as the unique solution to 2q 1 q 2 = 0 for q 2 1 2 ; 1 .
e D e N D if and only if.
Proposition 4 shows that more audit transparency increases the auditor's e¤ort (i.e., higher audit quality in expectation) only when the underlying accounting quality is relatively poor; and the Proposition is crucially linked to the sign of @p( ) @ . Note that (14) implies @p( ) @ < 0 is a su¢ cient condition to ensure a strictly positive equilibrium auditor's e¤ort. As
the proof for Proposition 4 shows, q < q is a su¢ cient and necessary condition for @p( )
The intuition for Proposition 4 can be illustrated in terms of the informativeness principle of optimal performance measures in agency theory (Holmstrom (1979) ). Since an audit failure acts as the performance measure for the auditor's e¤ort, its usefulness is enhanced when it becomes more sensitive to the auditor's e¤ort. That is, when the auditor anticipates a lower e¤ort is more likely to lead to an audit failure, she will have more incentives to work harder. Recall that an audit failure depends on both the auditor's vulnerability (l(q; ; )) and investor reliance ( p 2 ( )). While the auditor's vulnerability (l(q; ; )) is largely exogenous and depends only on the underlying accounting quality (q) and the underlying state ( ), how sensitive investors'reliance ( p 2 ( )) is toward the auditor's e¤ort is endogenously determined by the motives behind their use of information.
On the one hand, when q is relatively large and thus the accounting signal is quite informative regarding the state, investors use the auditor's opinion primarily for its information value to make correct investment decisions (invest when G is more likely and not invest when B is more likely). Speci…cally, they will rely more on the auditor's opinion when h is observed than when l is realized, simply because a more precise opinion helps better capturing the underlying state. Thus, a higher e¤ort by the auditor in fact may lead to more reliance by investors and a higher chance of an audit failure. Anticipating this, the auditor's incentives to exert e¤ort are muted.
On the other hand, when q is relatively small and the accounting signal is not very informative to predict the state, investors primarily use the auditor's opinion for its insurance value. A smaller in this case further enhances the insurance value of auditor's opinion. This is because when is low, investors are more certain that the auditor is vulnerable.
Consequently, l induces more reliance by investors on the auditor's opinion than h , increasing the odds of a lower auditor's e¤ort to render an audit failure. Anticipating this, the auditor's incentives to exert e¤ort are heightened.
It is worth noting that when investors rely on the auditor's opinion for its insurance value, they do so at the expense of investment e¢ ciency (i.e., sometime they purposely disregard their own informative signal and follow the auditor's opinion precisely when the auditor's opinion is of low precision). The silver lining of the insurance e¤ect, however, is to provide extra incentive to motivate auditor e¤ort, although this e¤ect is only present in the disclosure regime.
Since e N D is always increasing in q (as shown in Proposition 2(c)), the …nding in Proposition 4 that e D > e N D only for q < q suggest that the marginal e¤ect of q on the equilibrium e¤ort in the disclosure regime can actually be negative. This is indeed con…rmed by the next proposition.
Proposition 5 Under the Disclosure regime, when , q and h are su¢ ciently small, (a) the equilibrium auditor's e¤ort strictly decreases with q;
(b) the investment e¢ ciency strictly decreases with q.
The e¤ect of q on the auditor's e¤ort can be analyzed by examining how q a¤ects the marginal bene…t of e¤ort (i.e., the LHS of (14)). The LHS contains two terms: the …rst term is similar to that in (11) and therefore is always decreasing in q. This force is the same as that under the No disclosure regime and provides the auditor more incentive to work, as shown in Proposition 2(c).
However, q's e¤ect on the second term, l(q; ; ) p ( ) @p( ) @ , is more subtle. Speci…cally, it depends on the sign of @p( ) @ and of @ 2 p( ) @ @q :
It can be shown that @ 2 p( ) @ @q > 0 as long as is not too large, thus making it possible that increasing q lowers the marginal bene…t of the auditor's e¤ort and reduces the equilibrium audit quality.
To see the intuition behind Proposition 5(a), consider the extreme case where q = 1=2
and is close to zero. Here the auditor's opinion is irrelevant for assessing the project's underlying state of the world (i.e., the auditor's opinion has no information value); and investors do not care much of the opinion's insurance value. As such, p ( h ) p ( l ) 1=2.
This in turn implies that auditor's e¤ort does not very much a¤ect the probability that his vulnerability is acted upon by investors. When q increases, investors' reliance on the auditor's opinion is more sensitive to ( @ 2 p ( ) @ @q > 0). However, since this reliance is purely for the information value of the auditor's opinion, it has the perverse e¤ect on the auditor's e¤ort. In contrast, under the No Disclosure regime, the link between the auditor's actual e¤ort and investors' equilibrium reliance is weaker because it is based on the conjectured e¤ort (and audit quality), which gives rise to a positive relationship between the equilibrium auditor's e¤ort and q, as shown in Proposition 2(c).
Finally, under the Disclosure regime, increasing q on the margin has two e¤ects. The …rst e¤ect is similar to what is shown in Proposition 2(d), where q increases the insurance value of the auditor's opinion and can lead to a reduction in investment e¢ ciency. Furthermore, under the Disclosure regime, a higher q has an additional impact on investment e¢ ciency via its adverse impact on the auditor's e¤ort provision. As demonstrated in Proposition 5(d), the combined e¤ects are that a marginal increase in q may reduce the equilibrium e¢ ciency.
E¤ects of auditor transparency on investment e¢ ciency
A main argument for improving audit transparency (i.e., forcing auditors to disclose ) is that it can help improve the decision usefulness of audited accounting reports. In our setting, investors use the auditor's opinion for the investment decision. Therefore, we evaluate the decision usefulness of auditor transparency by comparing the equilibrium investment e¢ ciency across the two regimes.
Three forces are at play here. First, disclosing allows investors to tailor their investment decision to the realized precision of the auditor's opinion. We term this e¤ect as The intuition is that when the underlying accounting quality is low (i.e., q is small), the auditor's opinion cannot provide much information for the project's terminal case ‡ow and thus investors simply use the opinion for insurance purposes. When q = q , these two e¤ects exactly cancel each other out, making IE D = IE N D .
When the e¤ort e¤ect is present, the picture becomes more complicated. As Proposition In Figure 2 , is relatively large ( = 0:8). Figure 2a shows that the auditor's e¤ort under the Disclosure regime is higher if and only if q < q = 0:69. Figure 2b shows that around q the e¢ ciency comparison follows Claim 1's prediction. That is, when q is slightly below q , the investment e¢ ciency is higher in the No Disclosure Regime and the opposite holds when q is slightly above q . However, as shown in Figure 2c , when q is much larger than q , the e¤ort di¤erence between the two regimes becomes the dominant force, resulting in a higher investment e¢ ciency under the No Disclosure regime. 
Endogenizing Liability Parameter
Our analyses up to this point have treated the auditor's liability parameter as exogenous.
While an exogenous simpli…es the math, it raises the issue whether our results are robust to an endogenously chosen liability, which we address in this section. In order to maintain the key forces identi…ed in our setting without losing tractability, we make three changes to the main setup. First, the auditor's e¤ort e is assumed to be binary, with e 2 fe h ; e l g and 1 > e h > e l > 0. The incremental cost of e¤ort when e h is taken is C. Second, investors' signal precision p is also binary, with p 2 fp h ; p l g and 1 > p h > p l > 1 2 . Without of a loss of generality, we set l = 1 2 and assume that when investors are indi¤erent between following their private signal and following the auditor's opinion they will rely on the latter.
To focus on interesting cases, we restrict our attention to situations where investors' information is not too precise (either when it is p l or when it is p h ) such that they will never rely on the auditor's report regardless of q or . 12 In other words, these assumption assumes that there is value added from audited …nancial report. We also emphasize investment e¢ ciency in that we assume the personal cost to auditor C is su¢ ciently small, relative 12 Speci…cally, these assumptions entail p h > h > p l > 1 2 ; q >q whereq is such that p ( h ;q) = p l ; and p h 2 = max to the investment amount (K), and that the auditor e¤ort is su¢ ciently productive (that e h e l is su¢ ciently big). Under these assumptions, we allow to be chosen to maximize investment e¢ ciency given the disclosure environment. Thus, can be di¤erent in the two regimes and can be a function of q. The following proposition characterizes and compares the equilibrium solution under the two regimes.
Proposition 6 Assume the value of auditor's e¤ort is su¢ ciently high (relative to its cost) and that the informativeness of audited report is su¢ ciently high (relative to investors' private information). There is a discontinuous drop in investment e¢ ciency at q . Proposition 6 shows that our results are robust to endogenizing the liability parameter . This may come at a surprise as one suspects that any reduced incentives for the auditor to exert e¤ort can be made up for by ramping up liability. However, as Proposition 6 shows that increasing and thus restoring the auditor's e¤ort incentive are optimal if and only if q is relatively small. The intuition is as follows. Though increasing could increase e¤ort provision, it comes with a cost in the form of increased insurance e¤ect that leads to more ine¢ cient use of information by investors. Such cost becomes high when q is big; and in this case the optimal solution is to forego motivating high e¤ort by the auditor. This result suggests that auditor liability rules and auditor disclosure rules are not perfect substitute for each other as far as maximizing investment e¢ ciency is concerned.
The simpli…ed binary setting in this section also enables us to precisely compare the investment e¢ ciency under the two regimes. Speci…cally, Proposition 6 shows that when q is relatively big, e h is not motivated, which renders the investment e¢ ciency lower under the Disclosure regime than under the No Disclosure regime. This implies that, somewhat surprisingly, the higher underlying …nancial reporting quality (more informative accounting signal), the more opaque the information environment should be for the auditor's opinion from an optimal investment e¢ ciency perspective.
Conclusions
We examine the e¤ects of disclosing the precision of an audit opinion on audit quality and investment e¢ ciency in a setting where audit quality is a¤ected by auditor's e¤ort, which is in turn motivated by her liability in the event of an audit failure. We show that while higher audit transparency enhances the information decision usefulness of …nancial reports for investors, it can also adversely a¤ect the auditor's incentives and consequently lower the expected audit quality and investment e¢ ciency in equilibrium. We show that the underlying quality of …nancial reporting is an important determinant for this tradeo¤, and the case for audit transparency is weaker when the underlying …nancial reporting quality is high. Our …ndings also imply that the underlying …nancial reporting quality and auditing regulations are two interconnected elements. That is, whether increasing the underlying …nancial reporting quality has a favorable e¤ect on audit e¤ort and investment e¢ ciency depends on the auditor's disclosure requirement, and whether expanding the scope of auditors' communcation is desirable depends on the underlying reporting quality.
[ expected payo¤ from taking the project net of the initial investment is
if and only if p q + (1 q)(1 ).
Finally, when S = S B and the auditor unquali…es (scenario 4), investors' expected payo¤ from undertaking the project net of the initial investment is
if and only if, p p ( ) (2q 1) + 1 q 1 q (1 ) .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 (a) Given (7), the auditor's expected loss when choosing an e¤ort level e is e Pr (audit failure j h ) K + (1 e) Pr (audit failure j l ) K + C (e) :
Taking a …rst-order derivative on (15) with respect to e and sets it to zero, we obtain
where l(q; ; ) (1 )(1 )q.
Since (15) is strictly convex in e, the solution to (16) is indeed a global minimizer for the auditor. Finally, imposing the requirement that investors'conjecture is con…rmed in equilibrium and replacingê in (16) with the actual e¤ort choice e, the equilibrium auditor's e¤ort is determined by (12) :
K[l(q; l ; ) l(q; h ; )] p (e + (1 e) ) 2 = C 0 (e):
Clearly, both sides of above expression are continuous in e. Also, for the RHS, C 0 (0) = 0 and C 0 (1) = +1, while the LHS is bounded and strictly positive for all e. Thus, there must exist at least one solution to (12) and all solutions to (12) must lie strictly between 0 and 1.
(b) Note that at e = 0, LHS > RHS of (12). Also, at each e , LHS = RHS. Suppose there does not exist any stable equilibrium, i.e., whenever @[RHS of (12)] @e j e=e C 00 (e ). Then, it must be that LHS RHS, 8e. But this contradicts the fact that C 0 (1) = +1 and LHS is bounded.
(c) Taking a total derivative on (12) with respect to q, we obtain @ (LHS of (12)) @q + @ (LHS of (12)) @e de dq = C 00 (e) de dq =) de dq = @(LHS of (12)) @q C 00 (e) @(LHS of (12)) @e :
Note @ (LHS of (12)) @q = K(1 )( h l )p(e h +(1 e) l ) 2 + K(1 )q( h l )2p @p(e h + (1 e) l ) @q :
As the …rst term is clearly positive and we have @(LHS of (12)) @q > 0. Finally, recall that, by de…nition, in a stable equilibrium @[LHS of (12)] @e j e=e < C 00 (e ). Thus @e @q > 0. 
2 (1 p) dp
where t h (2q 1) h + 1 q and t l (2q 1) l + 1 q:
Note that
At h = l = 1=2,
From the proof to part (c), we have
Note that when h = l = 1=2, the numerator equals zero while the denominator is strictly positive due to C 00 (0) > 0 by assumption. Hence, @ N D @q < 0 when h = 1=2.
By continuity, there must exist a 0 > 0 such that 8 h < 0 , @ N D @q < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
The auditor's objective function when choosing an e¤ort level e is e l(q; h ; ) p 2 ( h ) l(q; l ; ) p 2 ( l ) K + l(q; l ; ) p 2 ( l ) + C (e) :
Taking a …rst-order derivative on (17) with respect to e and sets it to zero, we obtain max K[l(q; l ; ) p ( l ) 2 l(q; h ; ) p ( h ) 2 ]; 0 = C 0 (e);
Since (17) is strictly convex in e, the solution to (18) is indeed a global minimizer for the auditor. Note that (18) is free of investors' conjectureê and^ . This is because observing the realization of is a su¢ cient statistic for investors'investment decision.
As such, (18) is also the equilibrium condition for the auditor's e¤ort under the Disclosure regime. Finally, since only the RHS of (18) is a function of e with C 0 (0) = 0 and C 0 (1) = +1 and the LF S is a non-negative constant independent of e, there is only one solution to (18). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4 Our strategy of proving the proposition is to compare the two equilibrium conditions under the two regimes: (12) versus (13). Note that p( h ) 2 > p( l ) 2 () p( h ) > p( l ) () p 0 ( ) > 0:
As p 0 ( ) = 2q 1 q 2 [1 (1 )q] 2 ; p 0 ( ) > 0 if and only if 2q 1 q 2 > 0:
Note that 2q 1 q 2 = 0 only admits one solution between 1=2 and 1. Thus, there exists a q such that p 0 ( ) > 0 if and only if q > q ;
where q is the unique solution to 2q 1 q 2 = 0 s.t. q 2 [1=2; 1] :
Consider the case q 2 [ 1 2 ; q ) which implies p 0 ( ) < 0. As Proposition 2 has established e N D 2 (0; 1), we have h > e N D h + (1 e N D ) l > l =) p( h ) < p(e N D h + (1 e N D ) l ) < p( l ).
Recall l(q; ; ) (1 )(1 )q is decreasing in , we have l(q; l ; )p(e N D h + (1 e N D ) l ) 2 l(q; h ; )p(e N D h + (1 e N D ) l ) 2 < l(q; l ; )p( l ) 2 l(q; h ; )p( h ) 2 =)
LHS of (12) < l(q; l ; ) p ( h ) 2 l(q; h ; ) p ( l ) 2
Note LHS of (12) > 0. Thus, LHS of (12) < max K[l(q; l ; ) p ( h ) 2 l(q; h ; ) p ( l ) 2 ]; 0 = LHS of (13) =) e N D < e D :
Next consider the case q 2 (q ; 1] which implies implies p 0 ( ) > 0. As Proposition 2
has established e N D 2 (0; 1), we have h > e N D h + (1 e N D ) l > l =) p( h ) > p(e N D h + (1 e N D ) l ) > p( l ).
Thus, l(q; l ; )p(e N D h + (1 e N D ) l ) 2 l(q; h ; )p(e N D h + (1 e N D ) l ) 2 > l(q; l ; )p( l ) 2 l(q; h ; )p( h ) 2 =)
LHS of (12) > l(q; l ; ) p ( h ) 2 l(q; h ; ) p ( l ) 2
Note LHS of (12) > 0. Thus, LHS of (12) > max K[l(q; l ; ) p ( h ) 2 l(q; h ; ) p ( l ) 2 ]; 0 = LHS of (13) =) e N D > e D :
Finally, when q = q , p 0 ( ) > 0. Hence, Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
(a) We …rst show that when q is su¢ ciently small e D > 0. Clearly, the equilibrium e¤ort level is strictly positive, i¤,
Thus, a su¢ cient condition for e D > 0 is for (1 )p( ) 2 to be decreasing in . where v( ; q; ) = 3 (1 ) + 5 + (1 ) 2 6 q (1 ) (3 2 ) q 2 . Since (2q 1) +1 q [1 q(1 )] 3 > 0, the sign of @[(1 )p( ) 2 ] @ is determined by v( ; q; ). Note that @v( ; q; ) @ = q (1 ) 2 q 2 (1 ) (3 2 ) 0:
To see the last inequality, note @ q (1 ) 2 q 2 (1 ) (3 2 ) @q = (1 ) 2 2q(1 )( 3 2 ) = (1 ) [1 2q (3 2 ) is increasing in , a su¢ cient condition for e D > 0 is q < 3(1 l ) 5 6 l .
Next, we show that when and h su¢ ciently small, q [(1 l )p( l ) 2 (1 h )p( h ) 2 ] decreases with respect to q. This, together with the already established result that e¤ort is strictly positive when q su¢ ciently small, implies that e¤ort strictly decreases with respect to q. De…ne g ( ; q; ) @ @q [q (1 ) p ( ) 2 ] = (1 ) p( ) 2 + 2q(1 )p( ) @p( ) @q :
A su¢ cient condition for q [(1 l )p( l ) 2 (1 h )p( h ) 2 ] to decrease with respect to q is that @g( ;q; ) @ > 0. After some tedious algebra, we obtain @g ( ; q; ) @ = h ( ; q; Obviously,
let's go through the three expressions in d D dq one by one. Part (a) of the proposition has already established that de D dq < 0 when , q and h are su¢ ciently small. Next, note that when = 0, @ D @e D = 2 (t h t l ) (t h + t l 1) > 0;
which implies @ D @e D > 0 when is su¢ ciently small. Finally, using the same proof technique in Proposition 2(d), it is easy to show that at h = l = 1=2,
which implies that @ D @q < 0, when h is su¢ ciently small. Thus, d D dq < 0 under the condition speci…ed in the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 1 When the auditor's e¤ort is the same under the two regimes, intense algebra can show that taking the second order derivative on f , we have f 00 (t) = 32(1 2q + q 2 )[(1 2q) + q(4t 2) + q 2 (3 8t) + 2 q 3 (2t 1)] [2 q (1 2t)] 4 We now claim that (1 2q) + q(4t 2) + q 2 (3 8t) + 2 q 3 (2t 1) < 0. To see this, note that it is obvious when t 3 8 as very term is negative. Next consider the case 0 t < 3 8 . Since the expression is linear with respect to t, if we can show that the expression is negative at both 0 and 3 8 , then we are done. When t = 0, the expression is 1 2q 2 q + 3 q 2 2 q 3 . Standard maximization techniques can show that this function achieves its maximum of 1 8 ( 2 2 ) < 0 when > 0. When t = 3 8 , the expression is obviously negative. Therefore, when q < q , 1 2q + q 2 > 0 and f 00 (t) < 0, which implies f (t) is concave and the insurance e¤ect dominates Blackwell e¤ect. Similarly, when q > q , 1 2q + q 2 < 0 and f 00 (t) > 0. Thus, f (t) is convex, implying that Blackwell e¤ect dominates insurance e¤ect. When q = q , f 00 (t) = 0, implying IE D = IE N D . Q.E.D.
